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There are two ways to read the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby
County Alabama v. Holder: as a minimalist decision or as a decision that
undermines the basic infrastructure of voting rights policy, law, and
jurisprudence. In this Article, we present the case for reading Shelby
County as deeply destabilizing. We argue that Shelby County has
undermined three assumptions that are foundational to voting rights
policy, law, and jurisprudence. First, the Court has generally granted
primacy of the federal government over the states. Second, the Court has
deferred to Congress particularly where Congress is regulating at the
intersection of race and voting. Third, the Court and Congress have
understood that racial discrimination is a problem and have operated from
a similar conception of what racial discrimination means. Shelby County
undermines all three assumptions. We explore what this means for voting
rights policy, law, and jurisprudence going forward.
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State’s Rights, Last Rites, and Voting Rights
GUY-URIEL E. CHARLES∗ & LUIS FUENTES-ROHWER**
I. INTRODUCTION
In Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder,1 the United States Supreme
Court struck down Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), the
provision that identified the jurisdictions required to obtain federal
preclearance, under Section 5 of the Act, for any policy changes related to
voting.2 Though the Court did not strike down Section 5,3 the Court has
effectively declared an end to the Section 4-Section 5 coveragepreclearance tandem that had been in place since the Act’s enactment in
1965.
The Court’s decision in Shelby County did not come as a surprise to
voting rights experts. Four years prior to Shelby County, in Northwest
Austin Municipal District Number One v. Holder (Northwest Austin),4 the
Court threatened to strike down Section 5 as unconstitutional.5 Though the
Court ultimately decided Northwest Austin on statutory grounds, it was
abundantly clear then that a majority of Justices were hostile to important
provisions of the Act and that the Act was living on borrowed time.6
What was surprising about Shelby County was the nature of the Court’s
legal analysis. Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court’s conservative
majority vacillated between Section 5 and Section 4 before settling on
Section 4 as the problem.7 Most surprisingly, the Court did not hang its hat
on a federalism rationale, but instead it focused on the failure of Congress
to treat the states with equal dignity.8 This principle of equal dignity,
∗
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1
133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
2
Id. at 2631.
3
Id. at 2618, 2631.
4
557 U.S. 193 (2009).
5
See id. at 202 (noting that Section 5 exceeds the prohibition of the Fifteenth Amendment).
6
See id. at 202–03 (noting that improvements to the Act were insufficient to justify such features
as the preclearance requirement and that the Act needed to be modified to accommodate current
societal needs).
7
See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2627–28, 2631 (deciding that only the coverage formula found in
Section 4 is unconstitutional, not Section 5).
8
See infra text accompanying notes 242.
**
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though mentioned in Northwest Austin, was explicitly rejected in South
Carolina v. Katzenbach,9 the landmark voting rights case, yet resurrected
to justify the Court’s decision in Shelby County.10
Reading the opinion optimistically, Shelby County could have been
worse, a lot worse. It is possible to read Shelby County as a narrow and
arguably minimalist opinion. For example, though the Court struck down
Section 4’s coverage formula, it did not deem Section 5 and the
preclearance requirement unconstitutional.11 Moreover, the opinion does
not have any obvious bearing on Section 2 of the VRA.12 Notwithstanding
the Court’s conclusion that the particular coverage formula employed by
the VRA was unconstitutional, the Court did not express any constitutional
opposition to coverage formulas per se and just focused on this one, which
it did not find justifiable on current facts.13 This leaves open the possibility
that an updated formula would pass constitutional scrutiny.
Additionally, while the opinion is less than pellucid with respect to the
standard of review that the Court employed to evaluate an act of Congress,
there is a good case to be made that the standard of review is unsettled and
left to be decided for another day. Better yet, one can argue that the Court
applied rational basis review, admittedly with some bite, and that the Act
failed rational basis review because Congress failed to do any updating.14
Consequently, under this reasoning, a new coverage formula should easily
pass rational basis review, even a rational basis standard that is applied
with some bite.15
Further, to the extent that the decision was motivated by what the
Court viewed as political avoidance on the part of Congress—the failure of
that body to update the VRA because it refused to bear the political costs
of doing so16—one could view Shelby County as not reflecting hostility to
the VRA itself but as communicating a message to Congress about the
perils of political avoidance. Relatedly, if we had a functioning Congress,
9
See 383 U.S. 301, 328–29 (1966) (“The doctrine of the equality of States, invoked by South
Carolina, does not bar this approach, for that doctrine applies only to the terms upon which States are
admitted to the Union, and not to the remedies for local evils which have subsequently appeared.”)
(citation omitted).
10
Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2620.
11
Id. at 2631 (emphasizing that the Court did not issue any opinion on Section 5 itself).
12
In fact, the Court took pains to underscore by the end of its opinion that its “decision in no way
affects the permanent, nationwide ban on racial discrimination in voting found in § 2.” Id.
13
Id. at 2629–30.
14
See, e.g., id. at 2630–31 (“If Congress had started from scratch in 2006, . . . . It would have
been irrational for Congress to distinguish between States in such a fundamental way based on 40-yearold data . . . .”).
15
See, e.g., id. at 2631 (“Congress may draft another formula based on current conditions.”).
16
See Richard H. Pildes, Political Avoidance, Constitutional Theory and the VRA, 117 YALE L.J.
POCKET PART 148, 153 (2007), available at http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/political-avoidanceconstitutional-theory-and-the-vra (noting that Congress has not renewed the VRA since 1982).
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one that could respond as an institution to the Court’s invitation to update
the Act, one might view Shelby County as dialogic. On this reading, Shelby
County would be contributing to the furtherance of voting rights policy by
providing Congress an incentive to act and to amend the VRA to reflect
twenty-first century concerns.
This narrow and minimalist interpretation of the case is plausible,
though, perhaps much too optimistic.17 The departing premise of this
optimistic read of Shelby County is that the Court essentially left intact the
basic infrastructure of its voting rights jurisprudence. But what if, instead,
the Court unsettled the fundamental premises of its voting rights
jurisprudence? If Shelby County signals the need for a complete reset on
the approach to voting rights that has been in effect for the latter half of the
twentieth century, what then is the import for voting rights reform and
jurisprudence going forward?
Consider instead a less optimistic reading of Shelby County, one that
views the Court’s decision as deeply destabilizing to the infrastructure of
voting rights law and policy. Such a reading construes Shelby County as a
radical departure from past precedent, particularly from South Carolina v.
Katzenbach.18 More specifically, we understand modern voting rights law,
policy, and jurisprudence—that is, voting rights law, policy, and
jurisprudence since 1965—as based upon a number of foundational and
basic assumptions. Three are absolutely critical. First, the Court has
generally granted primacy to the federal government over the states with
respect to the authority to regulate elections.19 Federal regulation,
particularly at the intersection of race and voting, displaced conflicting
state regulation.20
Second, the Court has accorded Congress a fair amount of deference
and leeway, particularly when Congress attempts to address the problem of
racial discrimination in democratic politics.21 When Congress has regulated
at the intersection of race and voting, the Court has generally provided

17
For a similar assessment of the case, see Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion of
Minimalism, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 713, 714 (2014).
18
See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (holding that sections of the VRA
that South Carolina challenged are constitutional).
19
See id. at 334 (acknowledging that the Act deviates from traditional congressional action, but
that such deviation is deemed appropriate in certain circumstances); see also Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at
2624 (noting that the Court had upheld the Act permitting Congress to depart from traditional
governmental principles in the past).
20
See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629 (commenting that the Fifteenth Amendment gives
Congress the power to identify and change laws in jurisdictions that abridge one’s right to vote because
of his or her race).
21
See id. at 2646–47 (citing United States v. McGregor, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1344–48 (M.D.
Ala. 2011)) (noting that case law illustrates the prevalence of racism in state politics).
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Congress a fair amount of deference as to its choice of means. And third,
the Court, Congress, and the Executive Branch have generally operated
from a similar and fluid conception of racial discrimination. All three
branches agreed that racial discrimination was a significant problem to be
addressed and all three have had the same general understanding of racial
discrimination, at least as a point of departure: intentional discrimination
by state actors.23 But more importantly, the Court has permitted Congress
to define and regulate discrimination broader than just intentional
discrimination, such as vote dilution or racial disparate impact, in large
part because of the need to eradicate intentional racial discrimination in
voting.24
When the Court held that Section 4(b) was unconstitutional in Shelby
County, it did not simply strike down a key provision of the VRA. Far
more importantly, it also questioned these key assumptions that
undergirded modern voting rights law and policy. Shelby County portends
a realignment in voting rights law and policy.
Voting rights policy, law, and jurisprudence must now pivot from
Shelby County. As a consequence there is much at stake in properly
interpreting the case. The voting rights bar must use Shelby County not just
to anticipate as accurately as possible the Court’s next move, but also to
think about where voting rights law and policy are likely to go. To some,
voting rights policy ought to severely break with the approach of the past,
while others argue that voting rights policy should adopt a “mend-it, don’t
end-it” approach by continuing the race-based and centralized regulatory
structure to protecting voting rights.25 Voting rights activists are currently
and urgently pressing the race-based approach against a structural

22
See, e.g., Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324 (holding, inter alia, that the Fifteenth Amendment allows
Congress to “use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination
in voting”).
23
See The Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b, h (banning tools that states used to
intentionally discriminate against minority voters, such as literacy tests and poll taxes); Nw. Austin
Mun. Utility Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 225 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“[T]he constitutionality of § 5 has always depended on the proven existence of
intentional discrimination so extensive that elimination of it through case-by-case enforcement would
be impossible.”).
24
See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2635 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]his Court has long
recognized that vote dilution, when adopted with a discriminatory purpose, cuts down the right to vote
as certainly as denial of access to the ballot.”) (citations omitted).
25
On the centralized regulatory framework of the VRA see, for example, Guy-Uriel E. Charles &
Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Mapping a Post-Shelby County Contingency Strategy, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE
131, 132 (2013), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/1172_7tf1ew4q.pdf and Samuel Issacharoff,
Beyond the Discrimination Model on Voting, 127 HARV. L. REV. 95, 116 (2013) (describing the
“command-and-control” regulatory model of the VRA).
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rethinking of voting rights law, policy, and jurisprudence. In particular,
voting rights activists are urgently lobbying in favor of a revised racebased and centralized coverage formula as a Shelby County fix that would
essentially reinstate the coverage-preclearance tandem.27 The preference
for a race-based approach is driven by the belief that race continues to be
the primary problem in voting. The preference for a centralized approach is
supported by the belief that what we have called elsewhere the “public
protection model” is the most effective way of conducting voting rights
policy.28
Coming to terms with the meaning and scope of Shelby County is thus
important for at least three reasons. First, the constitutional viability of a
legislative response to Shelby County will depend in part on the scope of
Shelby County. A race-based revised coverage formula that reinstates the
coverage-preclearance tandem assumes that Shelby County is a narrow,
minimalist opinion that did not disturb the fundamental underpinnings of
modern voting rights jurisprudence. If the narrow reading of Shelby County
is correct, a race-based formula that essentially updates the old coverage
formula should easily pass constitutional scrutiny. But to the extent that
Shelby County conveys a deeper hostility to the regulatory logic of the
VRA and to the extent that Shelby County has undermined the
jurisprudential infrastructure that once sustained the VRA, such an
approach is not likely to be successful.
Second, the Court’s decision in Shelby County may be significant
because it reflects a broader trend away from the dominant civil rights
model. That is, Shelby County may be reflecting or anticipating a trend
away from a race-based and centralized regulatory structure and towards
something else. To the extent that Shelby County portends a move away
from the centralized public protection model—that is, to the extent that the
conservatives on the Court have anticipated or are reflecting an erosion of
support in the political process for the current regulatory framework—
voting rights activists would be wise to focus their efforts more on the
future and less on the past.
26
See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Universalism and Civil Rights (with Notes on Voting Rights After
Shelby), 123 YALE L.J. 2838, 2838 (2014) (describing legislative responses proposed by voting rights
activists).
27
This is precisely what the recent Amendment to the VRA does. See Voting Rights Amendment
Act of 2014, H.R. 3899, 113th Cong. § 3(b)(3) (2014) (providing, inter alia, standards for determining
whether local or state governmental actions violate a citizen’s voting rights on racial grounds); see also
Bagenstos, supra note 26, at 2838 (describing legislative responses proposed by voting rights activists).
28
See Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, Mapping a Post-Shelby County Contingency Strategy, supra
note 25, at 132 (“The twenty-first century presents voting rights activists and scholars with two
different frameworks for securing and protecting voting rights. The first framework is essentially the
centralized regulatory structure that is quite familiar to voting rights activists and scholars. For ease of
explanation, we term this framework ‘the public protection model.’ Under this model, Congress
identifies both violators and violations.”).
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Third, even if Shelby County does not impose significant constitutional
constraints on future policy proposals and even if Shelby County does not
reflect a broader political zeitgeist toward a different regulatory structure
for voting rights policy, Shelby County might tilt the policy space against
the current regulatory framework.29 Thus, public policy options that were
on the wall before Shelby County are now off the wall after Shelby County.
Put a different way: a race-based Shelby County fix will most likely
depend upon a broader definition of racial discrimination than is consistent
with a reasonable reading of Shelby County, something broader than
intentional discrimination.30 Such a fix will also depend on a robust
conception of congressional power as against the states to enforce the
Reconstruction Amendments so as to prohibit racial discrimination in
voting, as well as an assumption that the Court will generously defer to
Congress’s factual determinations. This is a tall order. If the voting rights
bar bets wrongly on the meaning of Shelby County—that is, if Shelby
County is more disruptive than most voting rights activists assume—a
race-based approach that attempts to reinstate the coverage-preclearance
arrangement is not only likely to be struck down, but it will also jeopardize
other VRA provisions that are currently constitutional such as Section 2
and Section 5.
In this Article, we present the case against an optimistic reading of
Shelby County. Part II argues that the Court in Shelby County has declared
that systematic racial discrimination—what we term the “Era of Big
Racism”—is no longer a significant problem in voting. Part III maintains
that the Court has also indicated that it will no longer defer to Congress on
voting rights policy. Part IV shows that the telos of Shelby County is the
redemption of the South and the states from the past.31 Consequently, as
long as the current majority controls the Court, any future regulation that
depends upon systematic racial discrimination as justification,
distinguishes among the states, and attempts to make Congress the
29

An apt example is the Court’s decision in Beer v. United States, in which the Court held that
Section 5 of the VRA is violated only when a covered jurisdiction makes voters of color worse off.
Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140–41 (1976). It is not violated when a covered jurisdiction does
not make voters of color better off. Id. For a long time, both the liberals on the Court and, more
importantly, the voting rights community have deplored the Beer decision. Id. However, Beer has
become such an integral fabric of voting rights law and policy that the voting rights bar sought to
enshrine the Beer standard in the VRAA. Id.
30
In fact, the recent amendment to the Voting Rights Act, proposed by Representatives Jim
Sensenbrenner and John Conyers in the House and Patrick Leahy in the Senate, does just that. It defines
discrimination to include vote dilution, objection letters by the Department of Justice, and intentional
discrimination. H.R. 3899, 113th Cong. (2014); S. 1945, 113th Cong. (2014).
31
Prior to the Court’s decision in Shelby County but after oral arguments in the case, Professor
Joseph Fishkin advanced a very thoughtful argument along similar lines. See Joseph Fishkin, The
Dignity of the South, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 175, 175–76 (2013), http://www.yalelawjournal.
org/pdf/1174_iyst6fvo.pdf (discussing the concept of equal dignity afforded to states and its centrality
to the issues presented before the Court in Shelby County, as well as the concept’s philosophical roots).
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guarantor of voting rights for voters of color over the states will be
constitutionally suspect. By way of a conclusion, we consider the future of
voting rights policy under a future Supreme Court that would be more
receptive to the use of race in public policy.
II. THE END OF BIG RACISM? (IN VOTING?)
The voting rights bar is in the midst of two interrelated debates. The
first is whether race continues to be a significant problem in voting. The
second concerns whether voting rights policy going forward ought to be
race-based or universalist. Most voting rights activists are currently urging
a race-based approach that updates the coverage formula and reinstates the
coverage-preclearance regime that the Court undermined in Shelby County.
They view racial discrimination as an enduring and central problem in
voting.
As with the voting rights bar, voting rights scholars are also in the
midst of a debate with respect to the continued relevance of race and the
proper response to Shelby County. Professor Rick Pildes began this debate
years ago when he argued that “the narrow targeting model of Section 5 –
its effort to single out particular areas and changes in voting rules – is less
well suited to the voting rights problems of today than was the original
Section 5 to the voting-rights problems of its day.”32 Professor Samuel
Issacharoff has similarly argued against a race-based approach on the
ground that “current voting controversies, unlike the concerns of racial
exclusion under Jim Crow, are likely motivated by partisan zeal and
emerge in contested partisan environments.”33 In a related vein, Professor
Richard Hasen has argued that current voting rights controversies are about
both race and party.34 Consequently, courts should move “beyond race or
party” to force state actors to justify voting laws “discriminating against a
party’s voters or otherwise burdening voters.”35
In a recent article, Professor Spencer Overton has pushed back against
the universalist approach. Though he acknowledges that “race relations
have improved dramatically in the past fifty years, discounting the need to
prevent racial discrimination is a mistake.”36 In his view, “[r]ather than
abandon preclearance, Congress should update preclearance by tying
coverage to areas with recent voting rights violations.”37
32
Richard H. Pildes, The Future of Voting Rights Policy: From Anti-Discrimination to the Right
to Vote, 49 HOW. L.J. 741, 752 (2006).
33
Issacharoff, supra note 25, at 100.
34
Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party?: How Courts Should Think About Republican Efforts to
Make it Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 1 (2013).
35
Id. at 13–14.
36
Spencer Overton, Voting Rights Disclosure, 127 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 19, 21 (2013).
37
Id. at 20.
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The most extensive and comprehensive case against the universalist
approach has been made by Professor Samuel Bagenstos.38 Professor
Bagenstos has characterized the claims in favor of a universal approach to
voting rights into two categories, substantive and tactical. The substantive
category is whether a race-based approach or a universal approach is best
for addressing current voting rights problems. Professor Bagenstos argues,
contra Professors Issacharoff and Hasen, that the universal approach is
misguided because it would “leave a lot of significant discrimination
against black and Latino voters unremedied. That is because a great deal of
that discrimination involves vote dilution, not vote denial, and it takes
place at the county and local, not state, level.”39
The tactical category refers to whether there are non-substantive
justifications for preferring one approach to the other. In particular,
Professor Bagenstos characterizes as tactical the argument that voting
rights activists should adopt a universalist model because the Court is not
likely to be receptive to a race-based approach. He concludes, “the tactical
arguments for the universalist position are likely overblown.”40
To be fair, most of this debate is occurring purely on important
substantive and policy grounds, viz., whether voting rights policy is better
served by a universalist approach than a race-based or particularlist one.
But the policy options available in the short or long-term are realistically
constrained by the constitutional framework. Thus, whether the tactical
case for the universalist position is overblown or not and whether claims of
vote dilution would count, or continue to count, as racial discrimination
depends upon the constraints of Shelby County. An important question for
voting rights activists who are crafting a response to Shelby County is
determining whether Shelby County is a minimalist decision or whether it
fundamentally alters our basic assumptions about the Court’s voting rights
jurisprudence. Judging by the early reaction to the decision, many in the
voting rights community, not surprisingly, seem attracted to a narrow read
of Shelby County.
As we noted at the outset, Shelby County can be read as a minimalist
opinion. For one, the Court only struck down Section 4(b) of the Act, the
coverage formula, and only because of what it viewed as changed
circumstances.41 This means, and the Court took pains to underscore, that
Section 2 of the Act, its permanent, nationwide provision, remains
38
Samuel R. Bagenstos, Universalism and Civil Rights (with Notes on Voting Rights After
Shelby), 123 YALE L.J. 2838 (2014).
39
Id. at 36. By vote denial, Bagestos means “actions . . . [such as] altering electoral districts,
moving from district-based to at-large elections, changing election dates, and so forth . . . that dilute the
voting strength of growing black and Latino communities.” Id.
40
Id. at 39.
41
Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2617 (2013).
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unaffected, as does Section 5, the preclearance requirement. Furthermore,
one could read the Court’s decision as not reflecting hostility to the VRA’s
regulatory structure, but mainly as a message to Congress for failing to
update the Act because Congress feared a political backlash.43 Recall also
the majority’s annoyance that Congress not only failed to narrow the VRA,
but it also expanded the scope of the Act when it renewed Section 5 in
2006.44 If Shelby County prompts Congress to enact a modern statute, one
might even regard the opinion as salutary. On this reading, Shelby County
would be contributing to the furtherance of voting rights policy by
providing Congress an incentive to act.
Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts positioned Shelby County as a direct
descendant of South Carolina v. Katzenbach.45 In South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, the Court adopted a rationality test and concluded that the
coverage formula was “rational in both practice and theory.”46 Congress
designed the formula to target the most egregious states and the formula
performed as intended. Congress’s formula only needed to be rational. This
is, arguably, the same test that the Court purported to use in Shelby
County.47 The cases come out differently only because Congress did not
justify its extension of the formula with new evidence.48 The voting and
registration disparities that undergirded the original formula no longer
exist, and though “the Nation is no longer divided along those lines, . . . the
Voting Rights Act continues to treat it as if it were.”49 In other words, the
Court is not breaking new ground with Shelby County; it is simply situating
new facts within established legal doctrine. Relatedly, the Court
acknowledged that “[s]triking down an Act of Congress ‘is the gravest and
most delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform.’”50 And thus,
42
See id. at 2631 (“Our decision in no way affects the permanent, nationwide ban on racial
discrimination in voting found in § 2. We issue no holding on § 5 itself, only the coverage formula.”).
43
Pildes, Political Avoidance, supra note 16, at 148.
44
Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2626–27.
45
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); see Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2624–25
(discussing how the prevalence of racially discriminatory voting policies in covered jurisdictions has
lessened since the Court’s decision in South Carolina v. Katzenbach).
46
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 330.
47
See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2624−25. (describing the test as rational for the circumstances in
the past and that a rational test will be used for the circumstances of present).
48
See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009) (discussing the
fact that the coverage formula is based on old data); id. at 226 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (explaining that evidence of discrimination, which previously caused Congress to
uphold Section 5, no longer exists and that the lack of this evidence undermines the basis for retaining
it); Jenigh J. Garrett, The Continued Need for the Voting Rights Act: Examining Second-Generation
Discrimination, 30 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 77, 78 (2010) (explaining that both the majority and
dissent in Northwest Austin expressed, in dicta, constitutional concerns with the reauthorization of the
Act and the record which supported the reauthorization of the Act).
49
Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2628.
50
Id. at 2631 (quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring)).
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when the Court does so, it does so as a matter of last resort. From this
perspective, Shelby County is a minimalist decision because the Court was
forced to intervene surgically when Congress reauthorized a statute that
was not rational in theory or in practice.
But this is not the only way to interpret the decision. Shelby County
has reopened long running debates in election law, debates that were
temporized in the post-VRA period. Consider first the question of racial
discrimination. The telos of modern voting rights law, policy, and
jurisprudence has been the importance of eradicating any trace of racial
discrimination in voting.51 This consensus was the fulcrum for voting
rights policy and framed the Court’s approach to the Act, as well as its
approach to Congress.52
When President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act into
law on August 6, 1965, he called it “one of the most monumental laws in
the entire history of American freedom.”53 Coming on the heels of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, this was high praise from the President. But it
was not hyperbolic. Writing in 1959, the United States Commission on
Civil Rights emphatically declared, “qualified Americans are, because of
their race or color, being denied their right to vote.”54 This was not a
controversial conclusion. Within six years of the Commission’s report,
President Johnson addressed the nation and explained that “the harsh fact
is that in many places in this country men and women are kept from voting
simply because they are Negroes.”55
The Court accepted this view the following year in South Carolina v.

51
See, e.g., id. at 2618 (describing how Congress’s approach was strong but necessary to address
the evils of racism); Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, 557 U.S. at 205 (“Congress amassed a
sizeable record in support of its decision to extend the preclearance requirements, a record the District
Court determined ‘document[ed] contemporary racial discrimination in covered states.’ . . . The District
Court also found that the record ‘demonstrat[ed] that section 5 prevents discriminatory voting changes’
by ‘quietly but effectively deterring discriminatory changes.’”) (citations omitted).
52
See, e.g., Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2619 (stating that the Court would look at both
constitutional issues and the current needs of society in analyzing the Act’s measures); Nw. Austin
Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, 557 U.S. at 201–05 (discussing the successes of VRA with respect to
eliminating certain racial disparities in voting and analyzing Congress’s aims in this vein); Bartlett v.
Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 25 (2009) (“Still, racial discrimination and racially polarized voting are not
ancient history. Much remains to be done to ensure that citizens of all races have equal opportunity to
share and participate in our democratic processes and traditions; and § 2 must be interpreted to ensure
that continued progress.”).
53
John T. Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Lyndon B. Johnson: Remarks in the Capitol Rotunda at the
Signing of the Voting Rights Act, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 6, 1965), www.presidency.ucsb
.edu/ws/?pid=27140.
54
U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, 1959 107 (1959).
55
LYNDON B. JOHNSON, RIGHT TO VOTE: MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES RELATIVE TO THE RIGHT TO VOTE, H.R. DOC. NO. 117, at 2 (1965).
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56

Katzenbach. A cursory reading of South Carolina v. Katzenbach makes
clear that the historical backdrop of systemic and pervasive discrimination
framed the Supreme Court’s response. For the Court, evidence of pervasive
discrimination was readily available on the television set. Of particular
interest to us is the way that the Supreme Court in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach understood and summarized the “voluminous” congressional
record and, particularly, the majority reports.57 The Court first offered the
history of voter suppression in the late nineteenth century and the many
legal challenges that followed.58 This history culminated in the first civil
rights statutes since the Reconstruction Era, none of which had the desired
effect. Case-by-case litigation proved ineffective, for reasons of both time
and effort.59 Litigation was expensive, cases required a lot of time to
prepare and carry out through litigation, and, once a judgment was secured,
the affected jurisdictions could then enact new laws in order to evade
enforcement.60
The ultimate proof of racial discrimination was found in the numbers.
Voter registration rates had only inched forward since the mid-1950s. For
example, voter registration rates in Louisiana between 1956 and 1965
increased from 31.7% to 31.8%; in Mississippi, from 4.4% to 6.4%
between 1954 and 1964; and in Alabama, from 14.2% to 19.4% between
1958 and 1964.61 Most importantly, white registration rates in these
jurisdictions “ran roughly 50 percentage points or more ahead of Negro
registration.”62 For a telling example, the Court offered the litigation in
Selma, Alabama, sitting in Dallas County with approximately 15,000
voting-age blacks.63 After four years of litigation and great expense, and
even after two federal courts had found “widespread” discrimination in
voting, black voter registration only rose from 156 to 383.64
In his opening statement before the Judiciary Committee, Attorney
General Katzenbach relied on these figures for support of the proposed
voting rights bill. As he told the Committee, “[c]urrent voter registration
statistics demonstrate that comprehensive implementing legislation is
56
383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966) (“Congress felt itself confronted by an insidious and pervasive evil
which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious defiance
of the Constitution.”).
57
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309.
58
See id. at 310–13 (detailing the history and legal challenges of voter suppression in the late
nineteenth century).
59
Id. at 314.
60
Id. (noting that when plaintiffs brought suits against local governments for VRA violations and
received favorable judgments, the local governments who lost such cases would merely switch to
various other discriminatory devices that were not addressed by the VRA’s requirements).
61
Id. at 313.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 314–15.
64
Id.
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esential [sic] to make the 15th amendment work.” He offered the figures
in Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, and the example of Dallas County,
where, “[a]fter 4 years of litigation, only 383 Negroes are registered to
vote.”66 These figures, he later explained, “are indicative of a probability of
racial discrimination within those areas in violation of the 15th
amendment.”67
Critics of the Act disagreed with this characterization. For example,
Senator Ervin asked, in reference to the coverage formula, “do you not
think that the fact that less than 50 percent of the people vote or even the
fact that less than 50 percent of the people of voting age register may be
reasonably explained on grounds other than discrimination?”68 One
common answer was simply voter apathy.69 More forcefully, Judge
Leander Perez, representing Louisiana Governor McKeithen, explained the
figures as follows:
I think it is just a low type of citizenship. They do not have
the ambition, they do not have the urge, they do not know
enough about government, they do not care . . . . You are
willing to take statistics and fabricated statistics that do not
show the true facts.70
The constitutionality of the Act thus hinged on how the Court would
understand these data points and the record put together by Congress. In
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court agreed with the government’s
reading of the facts.71 In the Court’s words, “[t]he constitutional propriety
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 must be judged with reference to the
historical experience which it reflects.”72 This experience reflected an
encounter with “an insidious and pervasive evil which had been
perpetuated in certain parts of our country through unremitting and
ingenious defiance of the Constitution.”73 Thus, though the Court remarked
that in promulgating certain statutory provisions of the VRA, “Congress

65
Voting Rights: Hearing on S. 1564 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 9 (1965)
(statement of Nicholas Katzenbach, Att’y Gen. of the U.S.).
66
Id. at 12.
67
Id. at 25.
68
Id. at 28 (statement of Sen. Samuel J. Ervin, Jr., Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
69
See id. at 272, 560, 600, 632, 669 (providing the statements of, inter alia, Senator Everett
Dirksen; Senator Samuel J. Ervin, Jr.; A. Ross Eckler, the Acting Director of the Bureau of the Census;
James J. Kilpatrick, vice chairman of the Virginia Commission on Constitutional Government; and
Thomas J. Watkins, an Attorney from Mississippi, which discussed the high degree of voter apathy
amongst a variety of demographics).
70
Id. at 547 (statement of Judge Leander H. Perez, Plaquemines Parish, La.).
71
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966).
72
Id. at 308.
73
Id. at 309.
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exercised its authority under the Fifteenth Amendment in an inventive”74
and even an “uncommon”75 way, it ultimately concluded “that exceptional
conditions can justify legislative measures not otherwise appropriate.”76 In
light of the pervasive history of discrimination in the exercise of the
franchise, the Court agreed with Congress that the VRA was necessary to
effectuate the “commands of the Fifteenth Amendment.”77
The structure of the Act, however, would lead the justices to revisit
this question periodically. Congress faced a malfunctioning political
process in 1965 and the VRA was designed to operate as a corrective
measure, and in some respects, not much more.78 Put differently, the VRA
was a remedy and not an entitlement. As originally implemented, the Act
had a five-year sunset provision, on the assumption that the special
provisions of the Act would finally turn the dream of the Fifteenth
Amendment into a reality.79 Once black voters could register and vote
freely, the need for the Act would subside. This was a sensible theory, but
five years—or ten, or even seventeen years—would not be enough. This is
why Congress continued to extend the special provisions of the Act in
short spurts.80
By 1980, when the Court examined the 1975 extension of the special
provisions of the Act in City of Rome v. United States,81 the Act faced its
toughest challenge yet. Among other objections, the City of Rome argued
that the Act was unconstitutional;82 that the Act cannot be applied to
changes that had a discriminatory effect but not a discriminatory purpose;83
that the Act had outlived its usefulness;84 and that the Act violated
federalism principles.85 President Nixon had named four new justices in

74

Id. at 327.
Id. at 334.
76
Id. (citation omitted).
77
Id. at 337.
78
See Voting Rights Act: Major Dates in History, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/print/votingrights-act-major-dates-history (last visited Sept. 25, 2014) (asserting that the primary aims of the
Voting Rights Act were to correct past barriers to political participation by minority groups and to
eliminate wrongful election practices).
79
See Federalist Society 2011 National Lawyers Convention, Showcase Panel IV: A Federal
Sunset Law, 17 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 339, 353–54 (2011) (speech of Professor William N. Eskridge, Jr.)
(discussing the 1965 Voting Rights Act’s sunset provision and its implications for federalism).
80
See Voting Rights Act: Major Dates in History, supra note 78 (noting that President Nixon,
President Ford, President Reagan, and Congress extended provisions of the Voting Rights Act over
short spans of time).
81
446 U.S. 156 (1980).
82
Id. at 173.
83
Id. at 172.
84
Id. at 180.
85
Id. at 178.
75
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three years, and President Ford had named one. More importantly, Nixon
had run his 1968 campaign under what became known as a “Southern
Strategy.”87 Would Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell
and Rehnquist continue to view the evidence as the Court had viewed it in
1966?
The early signs were not encouraging. In two cases prior to City of
Rome, the conservative justices seemed to be laying down a marker for a
reconsideration of the Court’s landmark voting rights decision in Allen v.
State Board of Elections.88 Allen, decided in 1969, was important as the
case that interpreted the scope of Section 5 broadly and in so doing adapted
the Voting Rights Act to new circumstances. 89 For example, in Perkins v.
Matthews,90 and in line with Allen, the Court held that changes to polling
places, boundaries lines, and electoral structures were required to be precleared.91 But Justice Blackmun, joined by the Chief Justice, issued a
warning, explicitly concurring in the judgment, “[g]iven the decision in
Allen v. State Board of Elections, . . . a case not cited by the District
Court.”92 And in Holt v. City of Richmond,93 where the Court enjoined the
City Council elections for the City of Richmond, Virginia,94 Justices
Burger and Blackmun offered a similar warning, this time joined by Justice
Rehnquist.95 The stage apparently was set for a reexamination of Allen. It
was only a matter of time until the Nixon appointees made their move.
But the warnings came to naught. In City of Rome, the Court followed
the previous script and once again sided with Congress and its view of the
evidence. For example, the Court acknowledged, with Congress, that
86
Bill Mears, The Supreme Court & Election-Year Blockbusters, CNN POL. (Mar. 26, 2012, 4:02
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/25/politics/scotus-health-care-blockbusters; Gerald R. Ford
Timeline, THE GERALD FORD PRESIDENTIAL FOUND., http://www.geraldrfordfoundation.org/about/
gerald-r-ford-timeline (last visited Sept. 25, 2014).
87
See ROWLAND EVANS, JR. & ROBERT D. NOVAK, NIXON IN THE WHITE HOUSE: THE
FRUSTRATION OF POWER 137 (1971) (“[I]mportant was the political frame of mind in the Nixon White
House as his Presidency began. The pivotal element in John Mitchell’s grand strategy of combining the
1968 Nixon and Wallace Votes for a Republican majority in 1972 was the South.”); see also, e.g.,
HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE PRESIDENCY: RACE AND GENDER IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 1960–1972 134 (1992) (discussing the inception, details, and goals of Nixon’s “Southern
Strategy”).
88
393 U.S. 544 (1969).
89
See id. at 565–67 (noting that the legislative history of the VRA and of Section 5 suggested
Congress’s and the Court’s consensus that they were meant to be broad in scope).
90
400 U.S. 379 (1971).
91
Id. at 394.
92
Id. at 397 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
93
406 U.S. 903 (1972).
94
Id. at 903.
95
Id. (“In joining in Mr. Justice Blackmun’s opinion concurring in the judgment in Perkins . . . I
indicated that ‘[g]iven the decision in Allen . . . ,’ the result reached by the Court in Perkins followed.
The instant motion for a stay is not an appropriate occasion to reconsider the holdings in Allen and
Perkins.”).
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registration rates of black voters had “improved dramatically” and that the
number of black elected officials had also increased.96 And yet, the Court
agreed with the congressional determination that “significant” registration
disparities remained between black and white voters in covered
jurisdictions.97 Also, black elected officials had only gained “relatively
minor positions” and did not hold statewide offices, and the number of
those elected to statewide offices was unrepresentative of the black
population within the covered jurisdictions.98 The decision to extend the
Act for seven years was “both unsurprising and unassailable.”99 The
Supreme Court reaffirmed the judgments of Allen and City of Rome with
respect to the pervasiveness of racial discrimination in voting.100
Shelby County broke the pattern. Of course, the Court politely
acknowledged early in the opinion that “voting discrimination still exists;
no one doubts that.”101 But the central message of Shelby County is that
“the era of big racism” is over.102 The majority confidently declared that
“[t]here is no denying . . . that the conditions that originally justified” the
coverage formula and preclearance requirement “no longer characterize
voting in the covered jurisdictions.”103 For the majority, the VRA
responded to a failure of the political marketplace where “[s]everal States
had enacted a variety of requirements and tests ‘specifically designed to
prevent’ African-Americans from voting.”104 But that era, according to the
majority, is not reflective of the present era. “Nearly 50 years later,” Chief
Justice Roberts proclaimed, “things have changed dramatically.”105 The
vestiges or indicia of official state discrimination in voting are no more;
“[v]oter turnout and registration rates now approach parity. Blatantly
discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare. And minority
candidates hold office at unprecedented levels.”106 Furthermore, Section 5
objections had declined significantly, from 14.2 percent in the decade after
enactment of the Act to a “mere 0.16 percent” in the decade before the last
96

City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 180 (1980).
Id.
98
Id. at 180–81.
99
Id. at 182.
100
See, e.g., Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 271 (1999) (“Monterey County was
designated a covered jurisdiction based on findings that, as of November 1, 1968, the County
maintained California’s statewide literacy test as a prerequisite for voting and less than 50 percent of
the County’s voting age population participated in the November 1968 Presidential election.”)
(citations omitted).
101
Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2619 (2013).
102
Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer, The Voting Rights Act in Winter: The Death
of a Superstatute 41 (Maurer Sch. of Law, Ind. Univ., Bloomington Legal Studies Research Paper
Series, Paper No. 278, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2377470.
103
Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2618.
104
Id. at 2624 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310 (1966)).
105
Id. at 2625.
106
Id. at 2621 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
97
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reenactment. These facts led the Court to only one conclusion, and
toward the end of its opinion, as if to drive home the message, the Court
once again declared in benediction, “[o]ur country has changed . . . .”108
Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion in Shelby County took a
decidedly different view. She acknowledged that the racial disparities in
registration and voter turnout in the covered jurisdictions had diminished
considerably, while also noting that this was to be expected after the Act
had been in place for over forty years.109 In direct response to the Chief
Justice’s use of Department of Justice objection percentages, she offered
instead the absolute number of such objections, which was substantial.110
Between 1982 and 2004, for example, the Attorney General objected to
more voting changes from covered jurisdictions (626 objections) than he
did between 1965 and 1982 (490 objections).111 Moreover, she argued that
electoral barriers had shifted to what are known as second-generation
barriers.112 These barriers included racial gerrymandering, shifting from
redistricted to at-large elections, and annexations.113
More generally, Justice Ginsburg urged deference to the record
compiled by Congress in support of the statute.114 Of course, that record
was not enough for the five-member majority. Responding to Justice
Ginsburg’s argument about the record, Chief Justice Roberts maintained:
“Regardless of how to look at the record . . . no one can fairly say that it
shows anything approaching the ‘pervasive,’ ‘flagrant,’ ‘widespread,’ and
‘rampant’ discrimination that faced Congress in 1965, and that clearly
distinguished the covered jurisdictions from the rest of the Nation at that
time.”115
Justice Thomas, whose partial concurrence and dissent in Northwest
Austin seemed to have served as an intellectual blueprint for the majority in

107

Id. at 2626.
Id. at 2631.
109
Id. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
110
Id. at 2639.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 2634.
113
Id. at 2635. Incidentally, these were the same barriers first recognized by the Court in Allen as
being within the scope of Section 5. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 550–52, 571
(1969) (discussing the proposed voting amendments to local Mississippi and Virginia voting laws that
the Court would examine under Section 5). This recognition is what made Allen one of the most
important cases in the history of the Act.
114
See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2652 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The record supporting the
2006 reauthorization of the VRA is also extraordinary.”). According to the Chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee, Representative Jim Sensenbrenner, the record in support of the 2006
reauthorization was “one of the most extensive considerations of any piece of legislation that the
United States Congress has dealt with in the 27½ years” he had been in the House. 152 CONG. REC.
H5143 (July 13, 2006) (statement of Jim Rep. Sensenbrenner).
115
Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2629.
108

2014]

STATE’S RIGHTS, LAST RITES, AND VOTING RIGHTS

499

116

Shelby County, articulated the point in the starkest terms. With respect to
the meaning of discrimination, he argued that the only “explicit
prohibition” of the Fifteenth Amendment was against “intentional
discrimination.”117 Moreover, “the constitutionality of section 5 has always
depended on the proven existence of intentional discrimination so
extensive that elimination of it through case-by-case enforcement would be
impossible.”118 So as not to be misunderstood, he declared that the
“extensive pattern of discrimination that led the Court to previously uphold
section 5 as enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment no longer exists.”119
Relatedly, he opined that vote dilution and second-generation barriers are
“not probative of the type of purposeful discrimination that prompted
Congress to enact § 5 in 1965.”120 Racially polarized voting, Section 5
enforcement actions, and Section 2 and Section 4 lawsuits do not constitute
“pervasive voting discrimination,” and are thus insufficient to justify the
coverage-preclearance regime.121
The epistemic dispute between the majority and dissent in Shelby
County is over whether racial discrimination, which the majority defines as
intentional and systematic discrimination, remains a significant problem in
voting today.122 Following Shelby County, we can no longer confidently
assume that the Court will permit Congress to justify voting rights law and
policy on the ground of remedying racial discrimination in the political
process. A current majority on the Court is deeply skeptical that state
actors continue to engage in systemic racial discrimination in voting. If this
point is correct, a Shelby County fix that attempts to reinstate the racebased coverage-preclearance tandem, albeit an updated version, will have
to overcome the Court’s challenge to show systematic racial discrimination
as a justification for the fix. This will be close to impossible to show
because as a consequence of the VRA itself, systematic racial
discrimination has abated significantly.123 Seizing upon this fact, the
majority in Shelby County all but declared that the era of big racism is
over. A central claim of Shelby County is that systematic racial
discrimination is a phenomenon of the past that can no longer justify broad
congressional power to burden state actors with tedious compliance
standards simply because of their tainted histories.124
116
Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 212 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
117
Id. at 223.
118
Id. at 225.
119
Id. at 226.
120
Id. at 228.
121
Id.
122
See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2626 (using statistics to show the problem of discrimination in
voting).
123
Id.
124
Id. at 2627–28.
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III. THE END OF DEFERENCE AND COOPERATION
Much epistemic uncertainty exists with respect to race and voting
discrimination. The central question is whether we still have systematic
racial discrimination in voting by state actors or perhaps, more precisely,
what is the extent of racial discrimination in voting. Given this uncertainty,
one possible resolution, perhaps the most obvious resolution, is for the
Court to defer to the institution that is best positioned to resolve that
uncertainty: Congress. There are many reasons why one might defer to
Congress. Consider three possibilities.
A. Deference Because the Constitution Demands It
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment explicitly grant Congress the “power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”125 Thus, one might
argue that the Reconstruction Amendments not only shifted power away
from the states to Congress, but also away from the Court to Congress.126
At the very least, one might view the Reconstruction Amendments as
establishing Congress and the Court as co-equal guarantors of equality in
voting.127 Congress is as able as the Court, at least in this context, to
determine what the Constitution requires.128
This was arguably the Court’s judicial posture in Katzenbach v.
Morgan,129 one of the most significant cases in the voting rights canon. In
Morgan, the Court upheld Section 4(e) of the VRA, which provided that no
person who has completed a sixth grade education in a school accredited
by the commonwealth of Puerto Rico shall be denied the right to vote on
account of an inability to read or write English.130 Congress enacted the
provision pursuant to its authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.131 The State of New York, challenging Section 4(e), sensibly
argued that Congress did not have the power under the Fourteenth
Amendment to prohibit New York from enforcing its literacy requirement
125
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2 (“The Congress shall
have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”).
126
See Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801, 1823 (2010) (“The
early history of the Reconstruction Amendments suggests that Congress believed that it had both the
power and the obligation to interpret the Constitution when it passed enforcing legislation . . . .
Including enforcement clauses in the text of the new amendments . . . presumed that Congress and the
courts were coequal partners in interpreting and enforcing these provisions.”).
127
Id.
128
See id. at 1826 (discussing how, with respect to remedying constitutional violations occurring
in society, broad congressional enforcement of constitutional principles has been more effective than
“courts’ more limited interpretations” of such principles).
129
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
130
Id. at 643, 658.
131
Id. at 646.
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because the Supreme Court held in Lassiter v. Northampton Election
Board,132 a case decided a scant six years earlier, that literacy tests were
not per se violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court disagreed.133 Quoting from a prior Reconstruction Era
precedent, the Court noted that “[i]t is the power of Congress which has
been enlarged.”134 Moreover, the Court explained:
A construction of §5 that would require a judicial
determination that the enforcement of the state law precluded
by Congress violated the Amendment, as a condition of
sustaining the congressional enactment, would depreciate
both congressional resourcefulness and congressional
responsibility for implementing the Amendment. It would
confine the legislative power in this context to the
insignificant role of abrogating only those state laws that the
judicial branch was prepared to adjudge unconstitutional, or
of merely informing the judgment of the judiciary by
particularizing the ‘majestic generalities’ of § 1 of the
Amendment.135
Thus, the question was not whether the application of the literacy
requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause, as the Court would
interpret the Constitution.136 Rather, “[w]ithout regard to whether the
judiciary would find that the Equal Protection Clause itself nullifies New
York’s English literacy requirement as so applied, could Congress prohibit
the enforcement of the state law by legislating under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment?”137 The Court went on to note: “[c]orrectly viewed, § 5 is a
positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its
discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure
the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.”138
Reviewing Congressional statutes enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, a reviewing court must keep in mind that “[b]y
including § 5 the draftsmen sought to grant to Congress, by a specific
provision applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment, the same broad powers
expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause.”139 Citing the “classic
132
Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51–52 (1959); see also Morgan,
384 U.S. at 648–49 (discussing New York’s arguments in its defense of the literacy requirement).
133
See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 658 (“[T]he limitation on relief effected in § 4(e) does not constitute
a forbidden discrimination . . . .”).
134
Id. at 648 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879)).
135
Id. at 648–49 (internal citations omitted).
136
Id. at 649.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 651.
139
Id. at 650.
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formulation” in M’Culloch v. Maryland,
as long as the statute is
“‘appropriate legislation’ to enforce the Equal Protection Clause [of the
Fourteenth Amendment],”141 the Court will defer to Congress’s
judgment.142 Testifying in the Senate during the 1969 hearings on the
VRA, former Solicitor General Cox referred to Morgan as “a token of
congressional supremacy.”143
In Morgan, the Court viewed Congress as a collaborator or partner in
effectuating voting equality.144 The Court deferred to Congress’s judgment
on the ground that the Constitution has granted Congress the power to
enforce the provisions of the Reconstruction Amendment as Congress
understands those provisions.145 Reflecting on the VRA and the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 in a related context, Professor Lucas Powe observed:
The Court was extending an offer to Congress to become a
full partner in the Court’s great tasks, just as Congress had
become with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. In making the offer the Court saw that its
views and those of Congress were harmonious. Each was
working as hard as it could to improve American life.146

140

17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
Id. at 651 (citing M’Culloch, 17 U.S. at 421).
142
In a controversial footnote, the Court explained that “Congress’ power under § 5 is limited to
adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to
restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees.” Id. at 651 n.10.
143
Amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearings on S. 818, S. 2456, S. 2507 and Title
IV of S. 2029 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st
Cong. 334 (1970) (statement of Archibald Cox, Professor, Harvard Law School).
144
Think here of accounts of the Court as a member of the national coalition of its day. For the
classic formulation, see Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 294 (1957) (“The main objective of presidential leadership is
to build a stable and dominant aggregation of minorities with a high probability of winning the
presidency and one or both houses of Congress. The main task of the Court is to confer legitimacy on
the fundamental policies of the successful coalition. There are times when the coalition is unstable with
respect to certain key policies; at very great risk to its legitimacy powers, the Court can intervene in
such cases and may even succeed in establishing policy.”); and Thomas M. Keck, Party Politics or
Judicial Independence? The Regime Politics Literature Hits the Law Schools, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
511, 518 (2007) (reviewing MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC
BRANCH? HOW THE COURTS SERVE AMERICA (2006); MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE
REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2006)) (“The fundamental insight of
the regime politics literature . . . is now reigning orthodoxy in political science and is increasingly
widespread in legal scholarship as well.”).
145
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 655–56 (1966).
146
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 265 (2000); see
Archibald Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 91, 91 (1966) (“A newer theme is the strong declaration of congressional power under Section
5 of the fourteenth amendment. If the Congress follows the lead that the Court has provided, the last
Term’s opinions interpreting Section 5 will prove as important in bespeaking national legislative
141
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This was just as the Reconstruction Congress envisioned.
Moreover, the Court’s prior cases would have also supported deference
as a constitutional imperative. Consider briefly the state of the
congressional powers doctrine at the time of Shelby County. In the voting
rights context, it is clear to us that both Morgan and South Carolina v.
Katzenbach easily support the extension of the Act in 2006.147 City of
Boerne v. Flores,148 decided in 1997, was also on the side of congressional
action.149 So was Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,150
which upheld a provision of the Family Medical Leave Act under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment on a theory of gender discrimination,151 and
Tennessee v. Lane,152 which upheld a provision of the Americans with
Disabilities Act on a claim of access to the courts.153 These and related
cases suggest that congressional powers reach farther under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment when Congress is dealing with types of
discrimination that would trigger heightened scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause. When Congress deals with racial discrimination, in
other words, its discretion is enhanced. This is precisely the category into
which the VRA is most applicable.
Further, the Court could have also relied on Hibbs and Lane on the
ground that voting is a fundamental interest that is directly protected under
the Reconstruction Amendments and thus deserving of heightened
scrutiny.154 Or following Justice Scalia’s dissent in Lane, the Court could
have also chosen to honor the principle of stare decisis and “apply the
permissive M’Culloch standard to congressional measures designed to
remedy racial discrimination by the States.”155 The bottom line is that
existing doctrine offered much support for Congress and the VRA. 156
authority to promote human rights as the Labor Board decisions of 1937 were in providing national
authority to regulate the economy.”) (footnote omitted).
147
See supra text accompanying notes 75–80 (acknowledging that the current evidence played a
role in the Katzenbach Court’s decision); supra text accompanying note 133 (stating that the Morgan
Court deferred to Congress’s research in its decision).
148
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
149
Id. at 536.
150
538 U.S. 721 (2003).
151
Id. at 737.
152
541 U.S. 509 (2004).
153
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531 (2004).
154
Id. at 533–34 (holding that “the fundamental right of access to the courts, constitutes a valid
exercise of Congress’ § 5 authority to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment”); Hibbs,
538 U.S. at 728 (“[S]tatutory classifications that distinguish between males and females are subject to
heightened scrutiny.”).
155
Lane, 541 U.S. at 564 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia hedges, and “would not, of course,
permit any congressional measures that violate other provisions of the Constitution.” Id. Assuming that
one believes that the “equality of states” doctrine is one such provision, the charge of inconsistency in
the pursuit of a policy goal is thankfully avoided.
156
See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Legislative Findings, Congressional Powers, and the Future of the
Voting Rights Act, 82 IND. L.J. 99, 122–26 (2007). One of the more interesting questions in the case is

504

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:481

B. Deference for Institutional Reasons: Congress Can Compile a Record
and Make Findings
Beyond the textual and constitutional argument, the Court might also
defer for institutional reasons. In particular, one might view Congress as
the best institution to resolve the types of epistemic uncertainty that we see
in the voting rights context. This is because Congress is able to make
nationwide systematic findings and to create a record in support of its
statute. It may be—and the historical record fully supports this—that as
between piecemeal adjudication through the judicial system and legislation
through the political process, adjudication is less well suited to resolve this
type of epistemic uncertainty. Thus, courts should defer to the epistemic
judgments of legislative bodies on the ground that legislatures are better
institutions to resolve epistemic uncertainties.
This was Justice Ginsburg’s contention in Shelby County. She advised
that “the Court should have left the matter where it belongs: in Congress’
bailiwick.”157 This was also the posture that the Court adopted in South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, where the Court framed the approach that would
guide nearly fifty years of voting rights jurisprudence: “As against the
reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any rational means to
effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in
voting.”158 Deference was the order of the day, and much language in the
Court’s opinion underscored as much. Sprinkled throughout the opinion
are references to “legitimate response[s]”159 by Congress, “appropriate
means”160 that Congress may employ, and “permissible method[s]”161 that
Congress may use.
To be sure, this language is less than crystal clear and could be
understood as an argument for constitutional deference. The problem for
the Court was that the VRA was an unusual statute. For one, Congress was
aiming its considerable powers at the Southern states, and, in so doing, it
sought to redraw the federalism lines that were drawn at the end of the first
Reconstruction. Complicating matters, the VRA did not only show distrust
of the state legislatures; the preclearance requirement similarly bypassed
southern judges, federal and state, by requiring covered jurisdictions to
why the majority in Shelby failed to rely on the Court’s prior federalism precedent. The phrase
“congruence and proportionality” is nowhere to be found in the opinion. Instead the Court turned to the
concept of the “equality of the states” to strike down Section 4(b). Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S.
Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013). As we argue in the last Part of this Article, the conservative justices had a much
larger goal in mind; redemption and existing doctrine had little if anything helpful to say about that. We
are indebted to our colleague Dan Conkle for helping us navigate these doctrinal questions.
157
Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2650.
158
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966).
159
Id. at 328.
160
Id.
161
Id.
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preclear their election changes with the Department of Justice or district
court in D.C.162 The preclearance requirement cast an accusing—even
offensive—light on southern judges and their integrity and it privileged an
administrative agency to the southern judiciary.
Chief Justice Warren’s majority opinion for the Court in South
Carolina v. Katzenbach responded to these concerns with history, the
specter of Bull Connor and, importantly for our purposes, the substantial
congressional record in support of the statute. This was not to say that
rationality review demanded extensive findings. Findings were not
generally required as a condition to uphold congressional acts as a
constitutional question,163 but they buttressed the case in this context as
Congress was exercising its powers with great inventiveness. With respect
to the record, the Court noted:
The constitutional propriety of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
must be judged with reference to the historical experience
which it reflects. Before enacting the measure, Congress
explored with great care the problem of racial discrimination
in voting. The House and Senate Committees on the
Judiciary each held hearings for nine days and received
testimony from a total of 67 witnesses. More than three full
days were consumed discussing the bill on the floor of the
House, while the debate in the Senate covered 26 days in all.
At the close of these deliberations, the verdict of both
chambers was overwhelming. The House approved the bill
by a vote of 328–74, and the measure passed the Senate by a
margin of 79–18.164
With the benefit of hindsight and the reality of Shelby County, it is easy to
see why emphasizing the record compiled by Congress was a risky move.
Justice Brennan could see it as soon as he read the first draft of the opinion.
In notes he wrote on the margins of his circulated draft, he queried the
reliance on the congressional record by Warren’s opinion. For example, he
asked, “Do we judge statutes by no. of witnesses[,] length of hearings[,]
unanimity of vote? The Chief is judging the legislative product as if it were

162
See id. at 359–60 (Black, J., dissenting) (“I cannot help but believe that the inevitable effect of
any such law which forces any one of the States to entreat federal authorities in far-away places for
approval of local laws before they can become effective is to create the impression that the State or
States treated in this way are little more than conquered provinces.”).
163
See id. at 326–27 (majority opinion) (explaining the limits of congressional power without any
mention as to the necessity of findings).
164
Id. at 308–09 (footnotes omitted).
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a judicial one.” By the end of the first part of the draft, he offered the
following criticism: “In several places, like this one, the Chief comes close
to writing this as if it were an advisory opinion. I think this might be
avoided. Are we reviewing the sections, any more than we are the
adequacy of the hearings?”166
Justice Brennan raised some important questions. How would the
Court go about deciding how many hearings are enough, or how many
witnesses, or pages of testimony? What weight should be given to the vote
margins by which the VRA and subsequent extensions pass each chamber?
Perhaps, most importantly, how convincingly must Congress demonstrate
the existence of racial discrimination to justify the VRA? These are
questions without definitive answers, and Justice Brennan wished to
remove the Court from taking a central role in deciding them. In particular,
he was looking to the future, to a time when the record would not be as
robust as it was then. He was looking, in other words, to the world that
gave rise to Shelby County.
We thus understand Katzenbach v. Morgan as Justice Brennan’s
attempt to fix what he perceived to be a flaw in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach. He wished to take the spotlight off the record and emphasize
instead the deferential standard of review.167 Deference, as we argued
earlier, was owed as a matter of constitutional law, not institutional
competence.168 Justice Brennan could foresee that the future of the Act
hung on the Court’s resolution of this debate. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, in
fact, Justice Harlan argued in his dissent that the Court in South Carolina
v. Katzenbach deferred to Congress only after that body had compiled a
record to present an affirmative showing of a Fifteenth Amendment
violation in support of its remedial action.169 Congress had done no such
thing in support of Section 4(e).170
Justice Brennan won this particular battle. The Court upheld Section
4(e) by going back to its traditional rationality review. The Court did not
mention the issue of legislative findings at all. The question was whether
Section 4(e) was “appropriate legislation” to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment, whether it was “plainly adapted to that end,” and whether it

165
Chief Justice Warren, Original Draft of South Carolina v. Katzenbach 3 (Feb. 23, 1966)
(Brennan Papers, Library of Congress, Box I:132, folder 6, copy on file with author) (including Justice
Brennan's handwritten notes on draft).
166
Id. at 11.
167
See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650–51 (explaining the court’s deference to
congressional power).
168
See supra part III.A (arguing that reconstruction amendments increased deference to Congress
actions regarding voting rights).
169
Morgan, 384 U.S. at 667 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
170
Id. at 669.
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was in accord with “the letter and spirit of the Constitution.” For
example, this was an area in which Congress brought a “specially informed
legislative competence.”172 Also, “[i]t was for Congress . . . to assess and
weigh the various conflicting considerations.”173 Congress was owed
deference because it was better positioned than the judiciary to determine
the existence and extent of racial discrimination in voting. More
importantly, the Court deferred because the Constitution so demanded. Of
note, nothing in South Carolina v. Katzenbach suggested otherwise.
This is precisely the debate we see in Shelby County between Chief
Justice Roberts in the majority and Justice Ginsburg in the dissent.
Channeling Chief Justice Warren in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, and as
a precursor to making an argument that “[i]t is well established that
Congress’ judgment regarding exercise of its power to enforce the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments warrants substantial deference,”
Justice Ginsburg sought to focus the Court’s attention on the “sizeable
record.”174 She remarked that “[t]he House and Senate Judiciary
Committees held 21 hearings, heard from scores of witnesses, received a
number of investigative reports and other written documentation of
continuing discrimination in covered jurisdictions. In all, the legislative
record Congress compiled filled more than 15,000 pages.”175 Similarly, the
record for supporting the extension of the preclearance requirement “was
huge.”176 In addition, she accused the majority of “mak[ing] no genuine
attempt to engage with the massive legislative record that Congress
assembled.”177 She went on to note:
Congress approached the 2006 reauthorization of the VRA
with great care and seriousness. The same cannot be said of
the Court’s opinion today. The Court makes no genuine
attempt to engage with the massive legislative record that
Congress assembled. Instead, it relies on increases in voter
registration and turnout as if that were the whole story. . . .
Without even identifying a standard of review, the Court
dismissively brushes off arguments based on “data from the
record,” and declines to enter the “debat[e about] what [the]
record shows.” . . . One would expect more from an opinion
striking at the heart of the Nation’s signal piece of civil-rights
171

Id. at 651 (citing M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 421 (1819).
Id. at 656.
173
Id. at 653.
174
Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2636 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
175
Id. at 2635–2636 (2013) (citing Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193,
205 (2009)); H.R. REP. NO. 109–478, at 5, 11–12 (2006); S. REP. NO. 109–295, at 2–4, 15 (2006).
176
Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2639.
177
Id. at 2644.
172
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178

legislation.

Chief Justice Roberts offered two responses to the dissent’s argument
that the majority refused to engage with the record. First, the Chief Justice
argued—a point that Justice Brennan anticipated—that the record amassed
by Congress in 2006 pales in comparison to the record amassed by
Congress in 1965. “Regardless of how to look at the record,” the Chief
remarked, “no one can fairly say that it shows anything approaching the
‘pervasive,’ ‘flagrant,’ ‘widespread,’ and ‘rampant’ discrimination that
faced Congress in 1965, and that clearly distinguished the covered
jurisdictions from the rest of the Nation at that time.”179 In other words, the
record did nothing to convince the majority that racial discrimination in
voting remained a significant problem in the twenty-first century. More
importantly, this was not a question of deference for the majority.
Second, the Chief Justice argued that “a more fundamental problem
remains: Congress did not use the record it compiled to shape a coverage
formula grounded in current conditions. It instead reenacted a formula
based on 40-year-old facts having no logical relation to the present day.”180
As Justice Brennan anticipated, and Chief Justice Roberts demonstrated, if
deference were owed to the record, it was a simple matter to conclude that
the record was not good enough, that the record had not met some mystical
or historical bar.
The Chief Justice had two choices in Shelby County. He could have
followed the historical path and treated the case as a question of
constitutional deference under the Reconstruction Amendments. This was
what the Court did in Morgan.181 Alternatively, he could have followed the
institutional path and considered the case as a question of deference under
conditions of epistemic uncertainty. This was what the Court did in South
Carolina v. Katzenbach.182 He followed the latter, of course, but with an
ironic twist. Though professing self-restraint, the majority in Shelby
County took a very aggressive view of the facts in order to strike down a
federal statute.183 In this respect, a conservative Court out-liberaled Justice
Brennan.
178

Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 2629 (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, 557 U.S. at 201; South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308, 315, 331 (1966)).
180
Id.
181
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 646–47 (1966) (holding that Section 4(e) of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 is “a proper exercise of the powers granted to Congress by §5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment”).
182
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308 (holding that the challenged sections of the
Voting Rights Act “are an appropriate means for carrying out Congress’ constitutional responsibilities
and are consonant with all other provisions of the Constitution”).
183
See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Judicial Activism and the Interpretation of the Voting Rights Act, 32
CARDOZO L. REV. 857, 859 (2011) (arguing that the Court, though maintaining a posture of deference
179
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C. Deference to Congress as a Partner
Finally, one might defer to Congress because the VRA—its history and
evolution—so counsels. According to Chief Justice Roberts, the VRA is
not “just like any other piece of legislation, . . . [as] this Court has made
clear from the beginning . . . the Voting Rights Act is far from ordinary.”184
We agree with the Chief Justice about the special nature of the VRA, yet
disagree about what this means. As we argue elsewhere, the VRA must be
understood as a superstatute, that is, landmark legislation that demands the
cooperation of multiple branches of government in order to fulfill its
purposes.185 Rather than a sharp break from the past, we understand the Act
as a necessary response to a fundamental democratic deficit. It is also true
that, from its inception, the Court has understood the VRA precisely in this
way and has willingly cooperated with Congress, as the people’s
representatives, in fulfilling the Act’s considerable promise. The point here
is that it takes (or took) all three branches working together to fulfill the
promises of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The Court needed
Congress’s help (and vice versa) to eradicate the scourge of racial
discrimination in voting.
To make sense of this argument, it is important to remember that
voting discrimination had been an issue that neither the political branches
nor the courts could address alone. In Justice Ginsburg’s apt description,
fighting voter discrimination “resembled battling the Hydra.”186 No sooner
had a court case declared a practice unconstitutional under the Fifteenth
Amendment than a new practice arose in its place. Adjudication proved to
be time-consuming and ineffectual. In important respects, the need for the
VRA reflected not simply the intransigence and persistence of racial
discrimination in voting, but the institutional limitations of the judiciary in
fulfilling the promises of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
But Congress also needed the cooperation of the judiciary to
accomplish the aims of the VRA. Further, it is clear that Congress was
confronting an insidious and pervasive problem devoid of easy solutions.
The language of the Act was short on specifics and subject to myriad
interpretations. What, after all, is a “voting qualification or prerequisite to
voting or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting?”187 When
to the Voting Rights Act, “has interpreted the language of the Act dynamically, often in total disregard
to the text of the law or the intent of Congress”).
184
Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2630.
185
See Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, The Voting Rights Act in Winter, supra note 102 (explaining
that a superstatute, such as the VRA, “is landmark legislation that addresses a significant public policy
question, the resolution of which compels the cooperation of all branches of government”); see also
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 27 (2010) (offering the VRA as a classic example of a superstatute).
186
Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2633 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
187
42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (2012).
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does a voting change “not have the purpose and will not have the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color?”188 And
what is the meaning of the language of Section 2 of the Act, which
prohibits the denial or abridgment of the right to vote “on account of race
or color?”189 These were questions for the future, for the courts to sort
through and for the executive to enforce through Section 5. The Court and
the executive would confront them in due course, flexibly and with a mind
towards eliminating the “blight of racial discrimination in voting.”190
The Court understood the need for a partnership in this context from
the moment it first confronted the VRA in the Katzenbach cases.191 The
Katzenbach cases signaled the Court’s willingness to share responsibility
with Congress to move the country forward.192 The Court knew that it was
unable to take on this problem all by itself. Perhaps the Justices were being
more than polite during President Johnson’s voting rights address as they
joined members of Congress in applause a number of times, which led
critics of the bill to question their impartiality.193
In one of the early and most significant voting cases to come before the
Court, Allen v. State Board of Elections, the Court strongly signaled its
intention to cooperate with Congress to address the problem of voting
discrimination.194 Allen is best known as the Court’s first substantive
interpretation of the VRA. The case is far more important to us, however,
for the way in which it handled a number of preliminary jurisdictional
issues. How the Court decided these questions would go a long way in
determining the effectiveness of the Act. Unsurprisingly, the Court decided
these questions expansively, even where the language of the statute was
either silent or in apparent tension with the Court’s preferred conclusions.
Take, for example, the question of coverage: what is the statutory
188

Id.
Id. § 1973(b).
190
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).
191
POWE, supra note 146, at 265 (“The Court was extending an offer to Congress to become a full
partner in the Court’s great tasks . . . .”).
192
See id. (“[T]he Court saw that its views and those of Congress were harmonious. Each was
working as hard as it could to improve American life.”); see also Cox, supra note 146, at 91 (“If the
Congress follows the lead that the Court has provided, the last Term’s opinions interpreting section 5
will prove as important in bespeaking national legislative authority to promote human rights as the
Labor Board decisions of 1937 were in providing national authority to regulate the economy.”)
(internal footnote omitted).
193
See Voting Rights: Hearings on S. 1564 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 642
(1965) (statement of James Kilpatrick, Vice Chairman of the Virginia Commission on Constitutional
Government) (“[I]t is . . . unfortunate that members of the Supreme Court of the United States
appeared—turned up to here [sic] the President’s message and appeared on the television cameras
applauding. I think this is a violation of the separation of powers of the United States and creates
imbalances.”).
194
Allen v. State Bd. Of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969) (weighing legislative history and
Congress’s intention in passing the Voting Rights Act ).
189
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definition of a “standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting” that
would be subject to preclearance under the Act?195 The Court could have
taken the view of the plaintiffs, who argued that the statute only covered
changes that determined who may register to vote.196 The Court rejected
this interpretation, on the view that “[t]he Voting Rights Act was aimed at
the subtle, as well as the obvious, state regulations which have the effect of
denying citizens their right to vote because of their race.”197 Instead, the
Court concluded that “[t]he legislative history on the whole supports the
view that Congress intended to reach any state enactment which altered the
election law of a covered State in even a minor way.”198
But as Justice Harlan pointed out in his dissenting opinion, this reading
of the statute ran into some very difficult problems.199 For example, the
words of the statute could not be clearer.200 Only voting changes that voters
must comply with were subject to preclearance under Section 5 of the Act;
to Justice Harlan, this was the end of the matter.201 Not so for a majority of
justices. In Allen, and in spite of this language, the Court found a
legislative intent to expand the reach of the Act that “all changes, no matter
how small, be subjected to § 5 scrutiny.”202 While the government’s brief
suggested that the language was “merely the result of an oversight,”203 the
majority opinion simply ignored the language altogether.
Allen was not the last case in which the Court interpreted the statutory
language expansively to update the Act or to address issues that Congress
did not anticipate.204 This is not to say that the Court has always expanded
195

42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2012).
Allen, 393 U.S. at 564.
197
Id. at 565.
198
Id. at 566.
199
Id. at 582–94 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
200
Here is the relevant portion of the Act:
196

Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set
forth in section 4(a) are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with
respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964, such
State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification,
prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not
have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color,
and unless and until the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the
right to vote for failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard,
practice, or procedure . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
201
Allen, 393 U.S. at 587 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
202
Id. at 568 (majority opinion).
203
Id. at 587 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
204
See Dougherty Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. White, 439 U.S. 32, 47 (1978) (interpreting the Voting
Rights Act Section 5 to encompass a rule requiring board of education members to take an unpaid leave
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the language of the Act. Rather, it is to say that the text of the VRA has, at
best, served as a jumping-off point for making voting rights policy. Not
even the plain meaning of an unambiguous text has cabined the Court’s
interpretations of the Act.
This was true as late as five years ago, in Northwest Austin. The case
seemed to present a fairly prosaic statutory interpretation question. Under
the clear terms of the statute, only states or political subdivisions could
seek bailout from coverage. The plaintiff, a utility district, was not a state,
and a political subdivision was defined by the statute as “any county or
parish, except that where registration for voting is not conducted under the
supervision of a county or parish, the term shall include any other
subdivision of a State which conducts registration for voting.”205 The lower
court correctly understood this language to bar the utility district from
escaping coverage. To the Court, however, “specific precedent, the
structure of the Voting Rights Act, and underlying constitutional concerns
compel a broader reading of the bailout provision.”206 From the Court’s
perspective, it had to amend the Act in order to avoid a constitutional
problem and strike down an act of Congress. The Court was clear on this
point: “all political subdivisions—not only those described in §14(c)(2)—
are eligible to file a bailout suit.”207
In Northwest Austin, the Chief Justice had been willing to author an
opinion updating the Act in order to save it. In Shelby County, however, he
wrote that “[w]e cannot . . . try our hand at updating the statute ourselves,
based on the new record compiled by Congress.”208 In Northwest Austin,
the Chief Justice expressed a reluctance to strike down an Act of Congress
because “Congress is a coequal branch of government,” the “Fifteenth
Amendment empowers ‘Congress,’ not the Court, to determine in the first
instance what legislation is needed to enforce it,” and because “Congress
amassed a sizable record in support of its decision to extend the
preclearance requirements.”209 The Court was not willing to strike down
the Act in Northwest Austin out of deference to a co-equal branch.
In Shelby County, the Court declared that the era of deference was
over. When Congress first promulgated the VRA, the Court remarked that

of absence while campaigning for office because it falls within the meaning of a “standard, practice, or
procedure with respect to voting”); United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 128 n.15 (1978)
(finding that the term “political subdivision” is only relevant for purposes of determining geographical
coverage where a whole state is not covered); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 388 (1971) (“§ 5
requires prior submission of any changes in the location of polling places”).
205
42 U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(2) (1964).
206
Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 207 (2009).
207
Id. at 211.
208
Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2629 (2013).
209
Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, 557 U.S. at 205 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the “coverage formula [was] rational in both practice and theory.” The
Chief explained that in 1966, “the coverage formula—the means of linking
the exercise of the unprecedented authority with the problem that
warranted it—made sense.”211 As explained by Chief Justice Roberts,
“rational in both theory and practice” meant that there was both a
theoretical and practical understanding of what caused the discrimination
(tests and devices); what were its effects (disparities in voter registration
and turnout); and how to address the cause and effect (the coverage
formula).212 Congress’s use of tests and devices as a way of identifying the
covered jurisdictions was rational because tests and devices were not
simply proxies for discrimination but were in fact instruments of
discrimination.213 “The formula looked to cause (discriminatory tests) and
effect (low voter registration and turnout), and tailored the remedy
(preclearance) to those jurisdictions exhibiting both.”214
Forty years later, the formula is no longer rational.215 This is because
the tests and devices that the formula used as a trigger are no longer
devices of racial discrimination. In 1966 literacy tests were synonymous
with racial discrimination and therefore it was rational to use them as a
trigger to capture the states that were engaged in systematic discrimination,
but because literacy tests have been banned for almost forty years, they
cannot be responsible for current voting problems.216 Thus, the government
does not have a story to tell about causation. Moreover, because voter
registration and turnout are equal between blacks and whites or have
approached near parity, the government also does not have a story to tell
about effect. Consequently, from the perspective of the majority, the
coverage formula is a remedy in search of a problem.217 The era of
deference has been replaced, at least from one scholar’s perspective, by the
era of disdain.218

210

Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2625 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
212
Id. at 2617 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301, 330 (1966)).
213
Id. at 2625 (quoting Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 330).
214
Id. at 2627.
215
We are grateful to Rick Pildes for helping us flesh out this point and urging us to address it.
216
Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2627 (“The formula captures States by reference to literacy tests
and low voter registration and turnout in the 1960s and early 1970s. But such tests have been banned
nationwide for over 40 years.”).
217
Having concluded that the trigger was no longer rational, in theory or in fact, because the
formula does not capture current purported discriminatory practices, the Court felt free to dismiss the
government’s reverse-engineering argument that “Congress identified the jurisdictions to be covered
and then came up with criteria to describe them.” Id. at 2628 (emphasis in original). Chief Justice
Roberts argues that the argument is not compelling because the government “does not even attempt to
demonstrate the continued relevance of the formula to the problem it targets.” Id.
218
Pamela S. Karlan, Democracy and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2, 65–66 (2012).
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IV. REDEEMING THE STATES AND THE SOUTH FROM THE PAST
Consider now the question of the proper allocation of authority for
elections as between the states and the federal government. This struggle
between the states and the national government with respect to the
apportionment of powers over elections has waxed and waned throughout
American history. Concomitantly, the Court has also assumed the role of
arbiter, fixing the metes and bounds of the authority of each over elections.
The Court has often stated as a constitutional principle the proposition that
the states “have broad powers to determine the conditions under which the
right of suffrage may be exercised . . . .”219 But it has sometimes qualified
the constitutional principle with the caveat that “once the franchise is
granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent
with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”220 The
tug of war between the states and the federal government for final say over
elections, and the Court’s role as arbitrator, is an important part of our
constitutional history.221 Shelby County is simply the latest scene, though
assuredly not the last, in a long running drama.
The obvious starting point is the Reconstruction Era, when the federal
government began to aggressively assert its authority against the states in
matters of elections. This was a time when the pendulum swung heavily
from the states, which were clothed with the authority to regulate elections
under the Constitution of 1787, to the federal government as protector of
voting rights.222 The classic example of this newfound posture is the
Military Reconstruction Act of 1867, which required that the new state
constitutions in the South extend the right to vote to “male citizens of said
State, twenty-one years old and upward, of whatever race, color, or
previous condition . . . except such as may be disfranchised for

219
Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959) (citing Pope v.
Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 633 (1904)).
220
Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966).
221
Professor Joshua Douglas has recently authored a wonderful piece exploring this question with
great depth. See generally Joshua A. Douglas, (Mis)trusting States to Run Elections, 92 WASH. U. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2405396;
see RICHARD M. VALELLY, THE TWO RECONSTRUCTIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK
ENFRANCHISEMENT (2004) (presenting a historical overview of the enfranchisement of African
Americans in America).
222
See VALELLY, supra note 221, at 16 (“Under the Constitution of 1787, the determination of
voting rights fell to state and local governments. But the Civil War and Reconstruction, and the ensuing
massive program of African American electoral inclusion, recast the constitutional responsibilities for
establishing and protecting voting rights by means of ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment and
passage of several implementing statutes. These legal initiatives posed an enormous challenge to
widely held conceptions of American federalism.”).
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participation in the rebellion or for felony at common law . . . .” The Act
was soon followed by both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,
which sought to delegate the responsibility for the full enfranchisement of
the newly freedmen to the national government. Taken together, these
various efforts to protect the franchise against racial discrimination
accomplished their aims as Blacks registered, voted, and took office at
unprecedented levels.
By the turn of the twentieth century, however, the pendulum had
clearly swung away from the promise of Reconstruction and from the
federal government and back to the states. Southern redemption proved
particularly unkind to the Black political community. The South used
myriad methods to disenfranchise black voters, including literacy tests and
poll taxes, complex registration and residency requirements, and fraud and
violence. These practices had their desired effect, so that “[b]y the early
1900s, such measures had virtually eliminated black political participation
in the South.”224 Reconstruction, with its promise of political equality as
enforced by a strong national government, was clearly over. The states
were once again in charge of elections.225
There would be fits and starts in the intervening years, from cases
striking down grandfather clauses and the white primaries in Texas, but not
until the Civil Rights Era would the pendulum shift towards a much
stronger national involvement in protecting the right to vote. The
archetypical representation of federal power was the Voting Rights Act of
1965. The Act was the actualization of the original meaning of the
Reconstruction Amendments, specifically the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. The VRA was a signal of national power and national
responsibility, as against the states, for preserving the right to vote,
particularly against racial discrimination. This is why we think that Justice
Ginsburg was right when she wrote in Shelby County that “[w]hen
confronting the most constitutionally invidious form of discrimination, and
the most fundamental right in our democratic system, Congress’ power to
act is at its height.”226
However, the VRA did not simply represent the apotheosis of federal
power; it was concomitantly a symbol of the subject position of the states,
specifically the southern states, and perhaps the most visible reminder of
our national and original sin, slavery. It was also a reminder of the Civil
223
Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, § 5, 14 Stat. 428, 429, amended by Act of Mar. 23, 1867, ch. 6,
15 Stat. 2, amended by Act of July 19, 1867, ch. 30, 15 Stat. 14, amended by Act of Mar. 11, 1868, ch.
25, 15 Stat. 41.
224
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 77
(2007); see J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910 (1974).
225
VALELLY, supra note 221, at 100.
226
Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2636 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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War and Reconstruction. By targeting selected southern jurisdictions
with a history of racial discrimination in voting, which happened to be
almost all of the states of the Old Confederacy, and requiring them to preclear these jurisdictions’ voting changes, the Act treated the southern states
as “little more than conquered provinces.”228
In both Northwest Austin and Shelby County, Chief Justice Roberts has
cryptically referred to the “federalism costs” of the VRA. Though he has
not said much about these federalism costs, if one examines these issues
from the context of the historical circumstances that gave rise to the VRA,
it is plausible to conclude that the supposed harm to the states is not
consequential but expressive. Northwest Austin and Shelby County help us
understand the “federalism costs” of the VRA in expressive terms; it is the
message that the VRA sends about the proper and respective roles of the
federal government and the states.229 Or perhaps more precisely and
directly, it is the fact that the VRA sends a message of national superiority
and state subservience over elections. This is the expressive harm that
Chief Justice Roberts framed in dignity terms in Northwest Austin and later
elaborated upon in Shelby County.
Whether one agrees or not with Justice Black’s provocative
characterization of the effect of the coverage-preclearance duo of the VRA,
the post-VRA Supreme Court understood the Reconstruction Amendments
to privilege federal regulation over state regulation in voting, particularly
where voting regulation intersected with race. It is in the full-throated
register of a nationalist that Chief Justice Warren roared in South Carolina
v. Katzenbach:
The language and purpose of the Fifteenth Amendment, the
prior decisions construing its several provisions, and the
general doctrines of constitutional interpretation, all point to
one fundamental principle. As against the reserved powers of
the States, Congress may use any rational means to effectuate
the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in
voting. . . . Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment declares
that “[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.” This declaration has always been treated as selfexecuting and has repeatedly been construed, without further
227

Fishkin, supra note 31, at 180.
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 360 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
229
See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483,
485 (1993) (explaining that expressive harms are the “kinds of harms against which the Constitution
protects”).
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legislative specification, to invalidate state voting
qualifications or procedures which are discriminatory on
their face or in practice.230
Though Chief Justice Warren perfunctorily acknowledged “the general
rule . . . that States ‘have broad powers to determine the conditions under
which the right of suffrage may be exercised[,]’” the general rule is
cabined by the corollary that the “Fifteenth Amendment supersedes
contrary exertions of state power.”231 Congress has a power that is
“‘complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the
constitution.’”232 Chief Justice Warren’s departing premise is nationalist to
its core. His premise presumes federal power as the default premise and
assumes the legitimacy of the exercise of federal power until proved
otherwise by a rational basis standard. For Chief Justice Warren and the
post-Voting Rights Act Supreme Court, Congress possesses near plenary
power over the states and only when Congress exercises its power
irrationally does it become unconstitutional.
By contrast, Chief Justice Roberts departs from a very different
premise altogether, that of state supremacy. As he notes:
States retain broad autonomy in structuring their
governments and pursuing legislative objectives. Indeed, the
Constitution provides that all powers not specifically granted
to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or
citizens . . .
More specifically, “the Framers of the Constitution intended
the States to keep for themselves, as provided in the Tenth
Amendment, the power to regulate elections.” Of course, the
Federal Government retains significant control over federal
elections. But States have “broad powers to determine the
conditions under which the right of suffrage may be
exercised.”233
For Chief Justice Roberts, the default position is the presumption and
legitimacy of state power as against the federal government.234 The Chief
Justice appealed to the Constitution of 1791 as opposed to the Constitution

230

Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324–25.
Id. at 325 (quoting Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965)).
232
Id. at 327 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824)).
233
Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452, 461–62 (1991); Carrington, 380 U.S. at 91).
234
See Douglas, supra note 221, at 27 (explaining that the current Court trusts states more than
Congress to administer elections).
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of 1870. It is as if the Reconstruction Amendments never happened.235 It is
federal, not state, power that must be justified under the Constitution.
In striking down Section 4(b) of the Act in Shelby County, Chief
Justice Roberts wrested the nationalist premise from its moorings and
replaced it with state supremacy as the pendulum swings yet again. As
importantly, the Chief Justice introduced, or he might say reintroduced, an
additional consideration. Recall that in South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
Chief Justice Warren stated as the “fundamental principle” plenary, or
near-plenary, Congressional power.236 In Shelby County, Chief Justice
Roberts, announced a different, competing, and incongruous fundamental
principle:
Not only do States retain sovereignty under the Constitution,
there is also a “fundamental principle of equal sovereignty”
among the States. . . . Over a hundred years ago, this Court
explained that our Nation “was and is a union of States, equal
in power, dignity and authority.” . . . Indeed, “the
constitutional equality of the States is essential to the
harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the
Republic was organized.” . . . Coyle concerned the admission
of new States, and Katzenbach rejected the notion that the
principle operated as a bar on differential treatment outside
that context. . . . At the same time, as we made clear in
Northwest Austin, the fundamental principle of equal
sovereignty remains highly pertinent in assessing subsequent

235
For a terrific discussion about the import of the Reconstruction Amendments for our
federalism, see Fishkin, supra note 31, at 179. We agree with Fishkin, if partially, when he writes:

A historical memory of a “War Between the States,” followed by a reunion between
noble blue and gray on equal terms—with Reconstruction a best-forgotten corrupt
interregnum in between—might well yield the conclusion that antebellum
understandings of state sovereignty remain largely intact, even today. However,
such a conclusion cannot be sustained if we instead remember the Civil War and
Reconstruction as a radical transformation of the South through federal military and
civilian power, with a series of amendments specifically ratifying the use of that
federal power to establish the equal citizenship of Southern blacks.
Id. We do think, however, that Fishkin’s historical account is a bit more complicated than he lets on.
See, e.g., Michael Les Benedict, Preserving the Constitution: The Conservative Basis of Radical
Reconstruction, 61 J. AM. HIST. 65 (1974) (arguing that the Republican Congress did not intend to
expand the power of the national government as against the states); Michael Les Benedict, Preserving
Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 39; Pamela Brandwein, A
Judicial Abandonment of Blacks? Rethinking the “State Action” Cases of the Waite Court, 41 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 343 (2007)
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South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966).
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The Chief Justice attributed the “fundamental principle” to the Court’s
decision in Northwest Austin. But Northwest Austin simply asserted the
point and provided no support for the assertion. Consider the relevant
passage from Northwest Austin:
The Act also differentiates between the States, despite our
historic tradition that all the States enjoy “equal sovereignty.”
Distinctions can be justified in some cases. “The doctrine of
the equality of States . . . does not bar . . . remedies for local
evils which have subsequently appeared.” But a departure
from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires
a showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is
sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.238
Prior to Northwest Austin, the argument for “equal sovereignty” was
generally understood as applicable only at the time of admission. The cases
cited by the Court do not hold otherwise. In United States v. Louisiana,239
for example, the Court explained that:
[t]his Court early held that the 13 original States, by virtue of
the sovereignty acquired through revolution against the
Crown, owned the lands beneath navigable inland waters
within their territorial boundaries, and that each subsequently
admitted State acquired similar rights as an inseparable
attribute of the equal sovereignty guaranteed to it upon
admission.240
And more importantly, South Carolina v. Katzenbach ratified the view that
the equal sovereignty argument was only relevant in the context of
admission of a state to the United States. The Court stated in Katzenbach
that “[t]he doctrine of the equality of States, invoked by South Carolina,
does not bar this approach, for that doctrine applies only to the terms upon
which States are admitted to the Union, and not to the remedies for local
evils which have subsequently appeared.”241
Given the Court’s clear and unequivocal rejection of the equal
sovereignty argument as a valid constitutional objection to the VRA in
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, how was it determinative in Shelby County?
237
Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623–24 (2013) (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util.
Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009); Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567, 580 (1911))
(footnotes omitted).
238
Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, 557 U.S. at 203 (internal citations omitted).
239
363 U.S. 1 (1960).
240
Id. at 16.
241
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328–29 (1966).
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The Court’s decision in Northwest Austin is of course the key point of
transition. As the Chief Justice said in response to one of Justice
Ginsburg’s points in dissent, “the dissent analyzes the question presented
as if our decision in Northwest Austin never happened. . . . [T]he dissent
refuses to consider the principle of equal sovereignty, despite Northwest
Austin’s emphasis on its significance.”242 As it has become clearer with
hindsight, the battle for the constitutionality of the VRA was lost on the
hill of Northwest Austin,243 though many in the civil rights community
thought otherwise at the time.
In Northwest Austin, the Court noted “our historic tradition that all the
States enjoy ‘equal sovereignty.’”244 The Court then went on to note that
there can be exceptions to the “historic tradition” because “[d]istinctions
can be justified in some cases.”245 The resurrection is performed in the
sentence that followed. The Court quoted South Carolina v. Katzenbach
for the following proposition: “The doctrine of the equality of States . . .
does not bar . . . remedies for local evils which have subsequently
appeared.”246 The Court closed out the paragraph by noting, in the
language that we quoted above, that “a departure from the fundamental
principle of equal sovereignty requires a showing that a statute’s disparate
geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.”247
As an aside, note how equal sovereignty begins as an “historic
tradition” at the start of the paragraph, morphs into a “doctrine” in the
middle of the paragraph, and comes to life as a “fundamental principle” by
the end of the paragraph. But more importantly, compare what the Court in
South Carolina v. Katzenbach actually said with the Northwest Austin’s
Court representation of Katzenbach; the strikeouts indicate how the Court
in Northwest Austin edited the portion it was quoting from South Carolina
v. Katzenbach: “The doctrine of the equality of States, invoked by South
Carolina, does not bar this approach, for that doctrine applies only to the
terms upon which States are admitted to the Union, and not to the remedies
for local evils which have subsequently appeared.”248 Northwest Austin not
only distorted the meaning of what the Court said in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach but also revived the equal dignity of the states that Katzenbach
buried. By essentially rewriting the South Carolina v. Katzenbach Court’s
argument on equal sovereignty in Northwest Austin, Chief Justice Roberts
242

Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2630 (2013).
See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin, Bootstrapping, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 115, 140 n.180
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was able to use Northwest Austin to “bootstrap” the equal sovereignty
argument into a viable legal argument. This then permitted him to accuse
the dissent of ignoring the principle of equal sovereignty, not as understood
in South Carolina v. Katzenbach of course, but as revived in Northwest
Austin.
Before Shelby County, we had a fairly strong grasp on the allocation of
authority between the federal government and the states for regulating
elections.250 While we knew that the Constitution delegated to the states
authority for administering elections, we assumed, justifiably, that the
scope of federal authority was fairly robust. In particular, when the federal
government was regulating at the intersection of race and voting, it was
operating within its zone of influence and was at the height of its powers.
In this vein, we further assumed that the Reconstruction Amendments
realigned the relationship between the federal government and the states.
This was the lesson of the civil rights revolution.
However, Shelby County has destabilized these assumptions. At root,
the conservative justices understand the Civil Rights Era as sui generis, a
moment in the nation’s history when abnormal conditions demanded a
commensurate and abnormal response. The VRA distorted the proper
relationship between the federal government and the states. This is why
Chief Justice Roberts has repeatedly emphasized the “extraordinary”
nature of the VRA and the “extraordinary” nature of the problem. These
departures were justified in 1965 and 1966,251 from the Chief Justice’s
perspective, because of the “extraordinary” nature of the problem, the
Court permitted Congress and the VRA to “sharply depart[]” from “basic
principles” of federalism and equal sovereignty.252 In 1965, the VRA
divided the Nation between North and South.253 Recall here the Chief
Justice’s question at oral argument as to whether “citizens in the South are
more racist that citizens in the North?” Or recall Justice Kennedy’s
249
We borrow the term from Professor Stuart Benjamin. See Benjamin, supra note 243, at 116.
(“The idea behind bootstrapping is that by undertaking Y, an actor creates the conditions that enable
that actor to undertake some further action Z. . . . A key element of bootstrapping is an actor using two
or more steps to achieve an outcome it could not achieve with a single step. The actor does not merely
build on conditions precedent that have arisen, but instead creates those conditions precedent.”).
250
Douglas, supra note 221, at 14 (“The Court, in Shelby County v. Holder, was not as generous
toward Congress’s rationale for its voting rule involving the preclearance mechanism of the Voting
Rights Act . . . . Although just one case, Shelby County is extremely significant in part because it
demonstrates the Court’s deep skepticism toward Congress’s asserted reasoning for its election laws.
This flies in the face of Constitutional authority to Congress to regulate the election process.”).
251
Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2624 (2013) (“In 1966, we found these
departures from the features of our system of government justified.”).
252
Id. at 2624.
253
Id. at 2628 (“In 1965, the States could be divided into two groups: those with a recent history
of voting tests and low voter registration and turnout, and those without those characteristics. . . . Today
the Nation is no longer divided along those lines, yet the Voting Rights Act continues to treat it as if it
were.”).
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question with respect to whether Alabama is better off as “its . . . own
independent sovereign or . . . under the trusteeship of the United States
government?”254 As the Court read the history:
It was in the South that slavery was upheld by law until
uprooted by the Civil War, that the reign of Jim Crow denied
African-Americans the most basic freedoms, and that state
and local governments worked tirelessly to disenfranchise
citizens on the basis of race. The Court invoked that
history—rightly so—in sustaining the disparate coverage of
the Voting Rights Act in 1966. But history did not end in
1965.255
Shelby County is a course correction. It aims to restore, from the
perspective of the current Supreme Court majority, the proper balance
between the federal government and the states by limiting congressional
power exercised pursuant to the Reconstruction Amendments. Quoting
Gregory v. Ashcroft,256 which limited congressional power exercised under
the Fourteenth Amendment against the state’s power to define the
qualifications of its office holder, the Chief Justice remarked that “the
Framers of the Constitution intended the States to keep for themselves, as
provided in the Tenth Amendment, the power to regulate elections.”257
From this perspective the Reconstruction Amendments did not alter the
balance between federal and state power, which was fixed by 1791,
following the ratification of the Bill of Rights.
But Shelby County is not simply about recalibrating the federal-state
balance; the majority is after bigger game here. Shelby County is also about
the redemption of the South.258 The Shelby County majority seeks to
redeem the states and the South from the past.259 The majority sees voting
rights law and policy as impermissibly backward-looking, too tied to the
past, and insufficiently forward-looking. Justice Thomas gestured toward
this point in his partial concurrence and partial dissent in Northwest Austin.
“Punishment for long past sins,” he argued, “is not a legitimate basis for
imposing a forward-looking preventative measure that has already served

254
Transcript of Oral Argument at 41–42, 51, Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612
(2013) (No. 12-96).
255
Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2628.
256
501 U.S. 452 (1991).
257
Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2623.
258
Fishkin, supra note 31, at 178.
259
See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629 (explaining how the Fifteenth Amendment supports
looking forward to a brighter future and not looking back in judgment).
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its purpose.” Chief Justice Roberts later echoed this point in Shelby
County. As he explained:
The Fifteenth Amendment commands that the right to vote
shall not be denied or abridged on account of race or color,
and it gives Congress the power to enforce that command.
The Amendment is not designed to punish for the past; its
purpose is to ensure a better future. . . . To serve that purpose,
Congress—if it is to divide the States—must identify those
jurisdictions to be singled out on a basis that makes sense in
light of current conditions. It cannot rely simply on the past.
We made that clear in Northwest Austin, and we make it clear
again today.261
In the same paragraph and quoting from Rice v. Cayetano,262 the case that
struck down a provision of the Hawaii Constitution that limited voting for
trustees for the Office of Hawaiian affairs to Hawaiians or native
Hawaiians, the Court noted that “[c]onsistent with the design of the
Constitution, the [Fifteenth] Amendment is cast in fundamental terms,
terms transcending the particular controversy which was the immediate
impetus for its enactment.”263 The next sentence in Rice v. Cayetano, which
Chief Justice Roberts did not quote, provides: “The Amendment grants
protection to all persons, not just members of a particular race.”264
If one listens carefully, one hears echoes of the Civil Rights Cases,
particularly in the Court’s admonition that:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of
beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable
concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the
progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere
citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and
when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in
the ordinary modes by which other men's rights are
protected.265
One is also reminded of Justice Scalia’s reproach in his concurring opinion
in Adarand v. Pena266 “under our Constitution there can be no such thing as

260
Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2525 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
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Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629 (internal citation omitted).
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528 U.S. 495 (2000).
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either a creditor or a debtor race. That concept is alien to the Constitution’s
focus upon the individual . . . .”267 He went on to caution:
To pursue the concept of racial entitlement—even for the
most admirable and benign of purposes—is to reinforce and
preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that
produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred. In the
eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is
American.268
One is also reminded of Justice Scalia’s comment during oral argument in
Shelby County where he characterized the VRA as a racial entitlement.269
Or, to close the circle, consider this quote from the Chief Justice from
Parents Involved in Community Schools: “The way to stop discrimination
on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”270
The clear message from a majority of the Court in Shelby County is
that the time has come to move on from the regulatory framework that
characterized voting rights law, policy, and jurisprudence for the last half
century. For the Court’s conservative majority, the regulatory framework is
no longer au courant but passé. “Current conditions” and “current needs”
is the persistent refrain of Shelby County. Racism, at least systematic
racism in voting, is a thing of the past and therefore is not a justification for
regulation. The South can no longer be tainted on the basis of its past
history. The federal government can no longer assert broad powers on the
basis of its past role as protector and defender of the voting rights for
people of color or as enforcer of the Reconstruction Amendments. As
Justice Thomas advised in Northwest Austin, the fact that the coveragepreclearance regime is no longer necessary “is not a sign of defeat. It is an
acknowledgement of victory.”271 As the majority would have it, it is time
to withdraw the troops, declare victory, and go home. This is the end of the
Second Reconstruction.
V. CONCLUSION: ON THE VOTING RIGHTS AMENDMENT ACT
If the broader reading of Shelby County turns out to be the correct,
Shelby County will limit the civil rights community’s attempt to restore the
status quo ante Shelby. In many respects Shelby County has already done
267

Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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so. Consider the Voting Rights Amendment Act of 2014 (the “VRAA”)
introduced by Representatives Jim Sensenbrenner and John Conyers in the
House and Patrick Leahy in the Senate.272 The proposed legislation is a
significantly scaled down version of the VRA and the old Section 4(a),
which it is replacing. The new proposed coverage formula would apply to
any state that committed five voting rights violations in the last fifteen
years and has had “persistent and extremely low minority voter turnout.”273
The VRAA defines a voting rights violation as a final judgment from a
court concluding that the state has violated the Fourteenth or Fifteenth
Amendment; or that the state has violated federal voting laws; or that the
Attorney General has refused to pre-clear a proposed change, not including
photo voter identification laws.274 The VRAA is proposed as a Shelby
County fix but it is scaled so as not to overstep the constitutional
boundaries laid down by Shelby County.
Some voting rights activists have objected to the VRAA on policy
grounds that it is too narrow and that it does not address modern voting
rights problems, such as voter photo identification requirements. Unlike
the old coverage formula, which applied to nine states275 and parts of seven
other states,276 the new VRAA coverage formula would apply only to four
states: Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.277 The VRAA does not
cover states such as Ohio, Florida, and North Carolina that have been the
site of recent voting rights controversies.278 Some Latino activists have also
complained that the VRAA does not do enough to protect language
minority groups.279
The VRAA may not simply be inadequate as a matter of policy,280 if

272
H.R. 3899, 113th Cong. (2014); S. 1945, 113th Cong. (2014); Press Release, Patrick Leahy,
U.S. Sen. For Vt., Leahy, Sensenbrenner & Conyers Lead Bipartisan, Bicameral Introduction of
Legislation to Restore the Voting Rights Act (Jan. 16, 2014), available at http://www.leahy.senate
.gov/press/leahy-sensenbrenner-and-conyers-lead-bipartisan-bicameral-introduction-of-legislation-torestore-the-voting-rights-act.
273
Voting Rights Amendment Act of 2014, H.R. 3899, 113th Cong. (2014).
274
Id. at 6–7.
275
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia
(except for 17 counties and cities). JAMES A. GARDNER AND GUY-URIEL E. CHARLES, ELECTION LAW
IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 279 (2012).
276
Id. at 280.
277
The Voting Rights Amendment Act of 2014: Moving Forward On The VRAA, NAT’L ASSOC.
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PERSONS: LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, http://www.naacpldf.org/case
-issue/voting-rights-amendment-act-2014 (last visited Oct. 30, 2014).
278
Id.
279
See NALEO EDUCATIONAL FUND REP., LATINOS AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: PROTECTING
OUR NATION’S DEMOCRACY THEN AND NOW 2, available at http://www.naleo.org/downloads/NALEO
_VRA_Report_5.pdf (noting that the VRAA would only restore protections to about two thirds of the
Latinos that were protected under the VRA).
280
As we wrote in 2009, prior to Northwest Austin:

526

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:481

one reads Shelby County broadly, certain parts of the VRAA are
constitutionally vulnerable. Notwithstanding the attempt to draft a racebased Shelby fix within the confines of Shelby County, as it turns out, this
is a difficult task to accomplish when one is operating within the confines
of a doctrine that is increasingly skeptical of the race-based approach. In
order to write a statute that is in any way effective, the VRAA must at least
skirt the constitutional lines laid down by Shelby County. For example, the
VRAA amends Section 3(c) of the Act in order to make it easier to bail-in
states and local subdivisions. Under the VRAA, a jurisdiction would be
bailed-in not only when the jurisdiction engaged in voting discrimination
that violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments—intentional
discrimination under the current statute—but when a jurisdiction violates
Section 2’s results, disparate impact, test.281
But if Shelby County signals the majority’s intent to limit the scope of
the VRA and, in this context, to limit the VRA’s scope to voting rights
violations that are the consequence of intentional discrimination by state
actors,282 the VRAA’s amended Section 3(c) may not only be struck down,
but it will also have unnecessarily put Section 2 within the Court’s
crosshairs. Similarly, the VRAA uses “persistent and extremely low
minority voter turnout” as a trigger for determining which jurisdictions
ought to be covered under a revised Section 4. However, if Shelby County
is properly read as limiting the scope of Congressional intervention where
Congress is enacting race-based voting legislation to eradicate systemic
racism, a trigger that relies on persistent low turnout will not be rational in
theory or practice.283 The persistently low turnout is not directly tied to
identifiable racial discrimination.
By any account, the VRAA is a modest intervention, in part because
the highly partisan legislative process in Congress limits what is politically
possible, but also in part because voting rights activists insist on framing
the Shelby fix in race-based terms and thus must operate within the Court’s
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confining Shelby County paradigm. Notwithstanding the fact that the
VRAA is a modest intervention, the VRAA is constitutionally vulnerable.
Shelby County presents significant challenges for those advocating in
favor of a race-based approach. Specifically, they will need to articulate a
clear understanding of what constitutes racial discrimination in voting in
the twenty-first century. Following the Court’s decision in Northwest
Austin, where the Court declined to strike down Section 5 of the VRA,
many in the civil rights community declared victory, notwithstanding the
fact that the writing was then clearly on the wall. The assumption was that,
notwithstanding the Court’s expressed skepticism, the conservative
majority would not dare strike down the VRA. Voting rights activists dared
the Court to blink. This time the Court did not blink and voting rights has
suffered a significant setback. Shelby County presents an important
opportunity for voting rights supporters to search for a better model that
best represents the challenges faced by voters in the twenty-first century.
The old consensus is no more; the past is gone. It is time to look forward
toward the future.

